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Abstract
In security, layout randomization is a popular, eﬀective attack mitigation technique. Recent work has aimed
to explain it rigorously, focusing on deterministic systems. In this paper, we study layout randomization
in the presence of nondeterministic choice. We develop a semantic approach based on denotational models
and simulation relations. This approach abstracts from language details, and helps manage the delicate
interaction between probabilities and nondeterminism.
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1 Introduction
Randomization has important applications in security, ranging from probabilistic
cryptographic schemes [10] to the introduction of artiﬁcial diversity in low-level
software protection [8]. Developing rigorous models and analyses of the systems
that employ randomization can be challenging, not only because of the intrinsic
diﬃculty of reasoning about probabilities but also because these systems typically
exhibit many other interesting features. Some of these features, such as assumed
bounds on the capabilities and the computational complexity of attackers, stem
directly from security considerations. Others, such as nondeterminism, need not be
speciﬁcally related to security, but arise because of the generality of the ambient
computational models, which may for example include nondeterministic scheduling
for concurrent programs and for network protocols.
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The form of randomization that we explore in this paper is layout randomization
in software systems (e.g., [6,18,7]). Layout randomization refers to a body of widely
used techniques that place data and code randomly in memory. In practice, these
techniques eﬀectively thwart many attacks that assume knowledge of the location
of data and code. Recent research by the authors and others aims to develop
rigorous models and proofs for layout randomization [19,3,13,2]. The research to
date has focused on deterministic, sequential programs. Here, we consider layout
randomization for programs that may make nondeterministic choices.
We phrase our study in terms of a high-level language in which variables are
abstract (symbolic) locations, and a low-level language in which they are mapped
to random natural-number addresses in memory. Both languages include a standard
construct for nondeterministic choice. We give models for the languages. For each
language, we also deﬁne a contextual implementation relation. Intuitively, a context
may represent an attacker, so contextual implementation relations may serve, in
particular, for expressing standard security properties. We characterize contextual
implementation relations in terms of semantic simulation relations (so-called logical
relations). Throughout, the low-level relations are probabilistic. Via the simulation
relations, we obtain a semantic correspondence between the high-level and low-level
worlds. Basically, simulation relations in one world induce simulation relations in
the other, and therefore contextual implementation in one world implies contextual
implementation in the other.
Thus, our approach emphasizes semantic constructions. In comparison with
prior syntactic work, arguments via models arguably lead to more satisfying secu-
rity arguments, independent of superﬁcial details of particular languages (as layout
randomization is largely language-agnostic in practice). They also help reconcile
probabilities and nondeterminism, which have a rich but thorny interaction.
Some of the diﬃculties of this interaction have been noticed in the past. For in-
stance, in their development of a framework for the analysis of security protocols [15,
Section 2.7], Lincoln et al. observed:
our intention is to design a language of communicating processes so that an ad-
versary expressed by a set of processes is restricted to probabilistic polynomial
time. However, if we interpret parallel composition in the standard nondetermin-
istic fashion, then a pair of processes may nondeterministically “guess” any secret
information.
They concluded:
Therefore, although nondeterminism is a useful modeling assumption in study-
ing correctness of concurrent programs, it does not seem helpful for analyzing
cryptographic protocols.
Thus, they adopted a form of probabilistic scheduling, and excluded nondetermin-
ism. In further work, Mitchell et al. [17] reﬁned the framework, in particular deﬁn-
ing protocol executions by reference to any polynomial-time probabilistic scheduler
that operates uniformly over certain kinds of choices. The uniformity prevents col-
lusion between the scheduler and an attacker. Similarly, Canetti et al. [4] resolved
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nondeterminism by task schedulers, which do not depend on dynamic information
generated during probabilistic executions; they thus generated sets of trace distri-
butions, one for each task schedule.
From a semantic perspective, a nondeterministic program denotes a function
that produces a set of possible outcomes; equally, a probabilistic program repre-
sents a function that produces a distribution over outcomes. Rigorous versions of
these statements can be cast in terms of powerdomains and probabilistic powerdo-
mains [9]. In principle, a nondeterministic and probabilistic program may represent
either a function producing a set of distributions over outcomes or else one produc-
ing a distribution over sets of outcomes. However it seems that only the former
option, where nondeterministic choice is resolved before probabilistic choice, leads
to a satisfactory theory if, for example, one wishes to retain all the usual laws for
both forms of nondeterminism [16,21,11].
To illustrate these options, imagine a two-player game in which Player I chooses
a bit bI at random, Player II chooses a bit bII nondeterministically, and Player I
wins if and only if bI = bII. The system composed of the two players may be seen
as producing a set of distributions or a distribution on sets of outcomes.
• With the former view, we can say that, in each possible distribution, Player I
wins with probability 1/2.
• On the other hand, with the latter view, we can say only that, with probability
1, Player I may win and may lose.
The former view is preferable in a variety of security applications, in which we may
wish to say that no matter what an attacker does, or how nondeterministic choices
are resolved, some expected property holds with high probability.
However, in our work, it does not suﬃce to resolve nondeterministic choice
before probabilistic choice, as we explain in detail below, fundamentally because the
probabilistic choices that we treat need not be independent. Instead, we construct a
more sophisticated model that employs random variables, here maps from memory
layouts to outcomes. The memory layouts form the sample space of the random
variables, and, as usual, one works relative to a given distribution over the sample
space.
Beyond the study of layout randomization, it seems plausible that an approach
analogous to ours could be helpful elsewhere in security analysis. Our models may
also be of interest on general grounds, as a contribution to a long line of research on
programming-language semantics for languages with nondeterministic and proba-
bilistic choice. Speciﬁcally, the models support a treatment of dependent probabilis-
tic choice combined with nondeterminism, which as far as we know has not been
addressed in the literature. Finally, the treatment of contextual implementation
relations and simulation relations belongs in a long line of research on reﬁnement.
Contents
In Section 2 we review some preliminary material on cpos.
In Section 3, we consider a high-level language, with abstract locations, stan-
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dard imperative constructs, and nondeterminism, and describe its denotational and
operational semantics. We deﬁne a contextual implementation relation with respect
to contexts that represent attackers, which we call public contexts; for this purpose,
we distinguish public locations, which attackers can access directly, from private
locations. We also deﬁne a simulation relation, and prove that it coincides with the
contextual implementation relation. The main appeal of the simulation relation, as
usual, is that it does not require reasoning about all possible contexts.
In Section 4, we similarly develop a lower-level language in which programs may
use natural-number memory addresses (rather than abstract locations). Again, we
deﬁne a denotational semantics, an operational semantics, a contextual implemen-
tation relation, and a simulation relation. These deﬁnitions are considerably more
delicate than those of the high-level language, in particular because they refer to
layouts, which map abstract locations to concrete natural-number addresses, and
which may be chosen randomly (so we often make probabilistic statements).
In Section 5, we relate the high-level and the low-level languages. We deﬁne
a simple compilation function that maps from the former to the latter. We then
establish that if two high-level commands are in the contextual implementation re-
lation, then their low-level counterparts are also in the contextual implementation
relation. The proof leverages simulation relations. In semantics parlance, this result
is a full-abstraction theorem; the use of public contexts that represent attackers,
however, is motivated by security considerations, and enable us to interpret this the-
orem as providing a formal security guarantee for the compilation function, modulo
a suitable random choice of memory layouts.
Finally, in Section 6 we conclude by discussing some related and further work.
2 Preliminaries on cpos
We take a cpo to be a partial order P closed under increasing ω-sups, and consider
sets to be cpos with the discrete ordering. We write P⊥ for the lift of P , viz. P
extended by the addition of a least element, ⊥. Products P ×Q and function spaces
P → Q (which we may also write as QP ) are deﬁned as usual, with the function
space consisting of all continuous functions (those monotonic functions preserving
the ω-lubs).
We use the lower, or Hoare, powerdomain H(P ) of the nonempty, downwards,
and ω-sup-closed subsets of P , ordered by inclusion. The lower powerdomain is the
simplest of the three powerdomains, and models “may” or “angelic” nondetermin-
ism; the others (upper and convex) may also be worth investigating.
For any nonempty subset X of P , we write X ↓ for the downwards closure
{y | ∃x ∈ X. y ≤ x} of X. We also write X∗ for the downwards and ω-sup closure
of X (which is typically the same as X ↓ in the instances that arise below).
Both H(−) and H(−⊥) are monads (those for lower nondeterminism, and lower
nondeterminism and nontermination, respectively). The unit of the former is x →
{x}↓ and any continuous map f : P → H(Q) has an extension f † : H(P ) → H(Q)
M. Abadi et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 298 (2013) 29–5032
given by:
f †(X) = (
⋃
x∈X
f(x))∗
For the latter the unit is x → {x} ↓ and the extension f † : H(P⊥) → H(Q⊥) of a
continuous map f : P → H(Q⊥) is given by:
f †(X) = {⊥} ∪ (
⋃
x∈X\{⊥}
f(x))∗
3 The high-level language
In this section, we deﬁne our high-level language. In this language, locations are
symbolic names, and we use an abstract store to link those locations to their con-
tents, which are natural numbers.
For simplicity, the language lacks data structures and higher-order features.
Therefore, locations cannot contain arrays or functions (cf. [2]), except perhaps
through encodings. So the language does not provide a direct model of overﬂows
and code-injection attacks, for instance.
There are many other respects in which our languages and their semantics are
not maximally expressive, realistic, and complex. They are however convenient for
our study of nondeterminism and of the semantic approach to layout randomization.
3.1 Syntax and informal semantics
The syntax of the high-level language includes categories for natural-number ex-
pressions, boolean expressions, and commands:
e ::= k |!lloc | e+ e | e ∗ e
b ::= e ≤ e | ¬b | tt | ff | b ∨ b | b ∧ b
c ::= lloc := e | if b then c else c | skip | c; c | c+ c | while b do c
where k ranges over numerals, and l over a given ﬁnite set of store locations Loc.
Natural-number expressions are numerals, dereferencing of memory locations, sums,
or products. Boolean expressions are inequalities on natural-number expressions,
negations, booleans, disjunctions, or conjunctions. Commands are assignments at
a location, conditionals, skip, sequences, nondeterministic choices, or loops. Com-
mand contexts C[ ] are commands with holes; we write C[c] for the command
obtained by ﬁlling all the holes in C[ ] with c. We further use trivial extensions of
this language, in particular with additional boolean and arithmetic expressions.
We assume that the set of store locations Loc is the union of two disjoint sets
of locations PubLoc (public locations) and PriLoc (private locations). Let c be a
command or a command context. We say that c is public if it does not contain any
occurrence of lloc := v or !lloc for l ∈ PriLoc. As in previous work [3], we model
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[[lloc := e]](s) = η(s[l → [[e]](s)]) [[skip]](s) = η(s)
[[if b then c else c′]](s) =
⎧⎨
⎩
[[c]](s) [[b]](s) = tt
[[c′]](s) [[b]](s) = ff
[[c; c′]](s) = [[c′]]†([[c]](s))
[[c+ c′]](s) = [[c]](s) ∪ [[c′]](s)
[[while b do c]] = μ θ : S → H(S⊥). λs : S.
⎧⎨
⎩
η(s) ([[b]](s) = ff)
θ†([[c]](s)) ([[b]](s) = tt)
Fig. 1. High-level denotational semantics
attackers by such public commands and command contexts; thus, attackers have
direct access to public locations but not, by default, to private locations.
The distinction between public and private locations is directly analogous to
that between external and internal state components in automata and other spec-
iﬁcation formalisms (e.g., [1]). It also resembles distinctions in information-ﬂow
systems, which often categorize variables into levels (e.g., [20]), and typically aim
to prevent ﬂows of information from “high” to “low” levels. We do not impose any
such information-ﬂow constraint: we permit arbitrary patterns of use of public and
private locations. Nevertheless, we sometimes use h for a private location and l for
a public location, and also associate the symbols H and L with private and public
locations, respectively.
3.2 Denotational semantics
A store s is a function from a ﬁnite set Loc of store locations to natural numbers.
When Loc consists of h and l, for example, we write (h → m, l → n) for the store
that maps h to m and l to n. A public (private) store is a function from PubLoc
(PriLoc) to natural numbers. We write S for the set of stores, SL for the set of
public stores, and SH for the set of private stores. Note the natural functions:
SL
L←−− S H−−→ SH
We write sL for L(s) and s =L s
′ when sL = s′L, and similarly for H.
The denotational semantics
[[e]] : Store →   [[b]] : Store → 
of expressions are deﬁned as usual with, in particular, [[!lloc]](s) = s(l). The deno-
tational semantics
[[c]] : S → H(S⊥)
of commands is given in Figure 1, where the semantics of the while loop is the
standard least-ﬁxed point one.
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〈lloc := e, s〉 → s[l → [[e]]s]
[[b]]s = tt
〈if b then c else c′, s〉 → 〈c, s〉
[[b]]s = ff
〈if b then c else c′, s〉 → 〈c′, s〉 〈skip, s〉 → s
〈c, s〉 → 〈c′, s′〉
〈c; c′′, s〉 → 〈c′; c′′, s′〉
〈c, s〉 → s′
〈c; c′′, s〉 → 〈c′′, s′〉 〈c+ c
′, s〉 → 〈c, s〉 〈c+ c′, s〉 → 〈c′, s〉
[[b]]s = ff
〈while b do c, s〉 → s
[[b]]s = tt
〈while b do c, s〉 → 〈c; while b do c, s〉
Fig. 2. High-level operational semantics
Example 3.1 Consider the two commands:
c0 = (h := tt; l := ¬!l) + (h := ff) c1 = (h := tt; l := tt) + (h := ff; l := ff)
According to the semantics, [[c0]] maps any store mapping l to tt to the set {(h →
tt, l → ff), (h → ff, l → tt)} ↓, and any store where l is ff to the set {(h → tt, l →
tt), (h → ff, l → ff)} ↓, while [[c1]] maps any store to the set {(h → tt, l → tt), (h →
ff, l → ff)}↓. In sum, we may write:
[[c0]](h → , l → tt) = {(h → tt, l → ff), (h → ff, l → tt)}↓
[[c0]](h → , l → ff) = {(h → tt, l → tt), (h → ff, l → ff)}↓
[[c1]](h → , l → ) = {(h → tt, l → tt), (h → ff, l → ff)}↓
Note that the semantics of the two commands are diﬀerent. Nevertheless, below
we show that these two commands are in a sense equivalent (with respect to public
contexts). 
3.3 Operational semantics
The high-level language has a straightforward small-step operational semantics. In
this semantics, a high-level state is a pair 〈c, s〉 of a command and a store or, in
case of termination, just a store s. The transition relation → is a binary relation
on such states. Figure 2 gives the rules for →.
Proposition 3.2 (Operational/denotational consistency) Let c be a com-
mand and s be a store. We have
[[c]](s) = {s′|〈c, s〉 →∗ s′} ∪ ⊥
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3.4 Implementation relations and equivalences
3.4.1 Contextual pre-order
We introduce a contextual pre-order L on commands. Intuitively, c L c′ may
be interpreted as saying that c “reﬁnes” (or “implements”) c′, in the sense that
the publicly observable outcomes that c can produce are a subset of those that c′
permits, in every public context and from every initial store. Thus, let f = [[C[c]]]
and f ′ = [[C[c′]]] for an arbitrary public context C, and let s0 be a store; then for
every store s in f(s0) there is a store s
′ in f ′(s0) that coincides with s on public
locations. Note that we both restrict attention to public contexts and compare s
and s′ only on public locations.
We deﬁne L and some auxiliary relations as follows:
• For X ∈ H(S⊥), we set:
XL = {sL | s ∈ X\ ⊥} ∪ {⊥}
• For f, f ′ : S → H(S⊥), we write that f ≤L f ′ when, for every store s0, we have
f(s0)L ≤ f ′(s0)L.
• Let c and c′ be two commands. We write that c L c′ when, for every public
command context C, we have [[C[c]]] ≤L [[C[c′]]].
Straightforwardly, this contextual pre-order relation yields a notion of contextual
equivalence with respect to public contexts.
3.4.2 Simulation
In addition to a contextual pre-order, we introduce a simulation relation  whose
main advantage, as usual, is that it does not require reasoning about contexts.
As in much previous work, one might expect a simulation relation between two
commands c and c′ to be a relation on stores that respects the observable parts
of these stores, and such that if s0 is related to s1 and c can go from s0 to s
′
0
then there exists s′1 such that s′0 is related to s′1 and c′ can go from s1 to s′1.
In our setting, respecting the observable parts of stores means that related stores
give the same values to public locations (much like reﬁnement mappings preserve
externally visible state components [1], and low-bisimulations require equivalence
on low-security variables [20]).
Although this idea could lead to a sound proof technique for the contextual
pre-order, it does not suﬃce for completeness. Indeed, forward simulations, of
the kind just described, are typically incomplete on their own for nondeterministic
systems. They can be complemented with techniques such as backward simulation,
or generalized (e.g., [1,14,5]).
Here we develop one such generalization. Speciﬁcally, we use relations on sets
of stores. We build them from relations over H(SH⊥) as a way of ensuring the
condition that public locations have the same values, mentioned above. We also
require other standard closure conditions. Our relations are similar to the ND
measures of Klarlund and Schneider [14]. Their work takes place in an automata-
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theoretic setting; automata consist of states (which, intuitively, are private) and of
transitions between those states, labeled by events (which, intuitively, are public).
ND measures are mappings from states to sets of ﬁnite sets of states, so can be seen
as relations between states and ﬁnite sets of states. The ﬁniteness requirement,
which we do not need, allows a ﬁne-grained treatment of inﬁnite execution paths
via Ko¨nig’s Lemma.
First, we extend relations R overH(SH⊥) to relations R+ overH(S⊥), as follows.
For any X ∈ H(S⊥) and s ∈ SL, we deﬁne Xs ∈ H(SH⊥) by:
Xs = {s′H | s′ ∈ X, s′L = s} ∪ {⊥}
and then we deﬁne R+ by:
XR+Y ≡def ∀s ∈ SL. (Xs = {⊥} ⇒ Ys = {⊥}) ∧XsRYs
If R is reﬂexive (respectively, is closed under increasing ω-sups; is right-closed under
≤; is closed under binary unions) the same holds for R+. Also, if XR+Y then
XL ≤ YL.
For any f, f ′ : S⊥ → H(S⊥) and relation R over H(SH⊥) we write that f R f ′
when:
∀X,Y ∈ H(S⊥). XR+Y ⇒ f †(X)R+f ′†(Y )
Finally, we write that f  f ′ if f R f ′ for some reﬂexive R closed under increasing
ω-sups, right-closed under ≤, and closed under binary unions.
3.4.3 Contextual pre-order vs. simulation
The contextual pre-order coincides with the simulation relation:
Theorem 3.3 Let c and c′ be two commands of the high-level language. Then
c L c′ holds if and only if [[c]]  [[c′]] does.
Example 3.4 We can verify that c0 and c1, introduced in Example 3.1, are equiv-
alent (with R the full relation). For instance, let S0 = {(h → ff, l → tt)} ↓ and
S1 = {(h → tt, l → tt)}↓. We have S0R+S1, and:
[[c0]]
†(S0) = {(h → tt, l → ff), (h → ff, l → tt)}↓
[[c1]]
†(S1) = {(h → tt, l → tt), (h → ff, l → ff)}↓
We can then check that:
[[c0]]
†(S0)R+[[c1]]†(S1)

Example 3.5 In this example, we study the two commands
c2 = ifh = 0 then l := 1 else (h := 0) + (h :=!h− 1)
c3 = ifh = 0 then l := 1 else (h := 0) + skip
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which seem to share the same behavior on public variables, but that are inherently
diﬀerent because of their behavior on private variables. According to the semantics,
we have:
[[c2]](h → 0, l → ) = {(h → 0, l → 1)}↓
[[c2]](h → j + 1, l → k) = {(h → j, l → k), (h → 0, l → k)}↓
[[c3]](h → 0, l → ) = {(h → 0, l → 1)}↓
[[c3]](h → j + 1, l → k) = {(h → j + 1, l → k), (h → 0, l → k)}↓
We can verify that c2 R c3, with R deﬁned as the smallest relation that satisﬁes
our conditions (reﬂexivity, etc.) and such that
{(h → k)}R{(h → k′)} for all k ≤ k′
For instance, suppose S0 = {(h → 5, l → 0)} ↓ and S1 = {(h → 7, l → 0)} ↓. We
have S0R
+S1, and:
[[c2]]
†(S0) = {(h → 4, l → 0), (h → 0, l → 0)}↓
[[c3]]
†(S1) = {(h → 7, l → 0), (h → 0, l → 0)}↓
We can then check that:
[[c2]]
†(S0)R+[[c3]]†(S1)
On the other hand, there is no suitable relation R such that c3 R c2. If there
were such a relation R, it would be reﬂexive, so {(h → 1)} R {(h → 1)}. Suppose
that S0 = {(h → 1, l → 0)}↓ and that S1 = {(h → 1, l → 0)}↓. We have S0R+S1,
and:
[[c3]]
†(S0) = {(h → 1, l → 0), (h → 0, l → 0)}↓
[[c2]]
†(S1) = {(h → 0, l → 0)}↓
We need
{(h → 1, l → 0), (h → 0, l → 0)}↓ R+{(h → 0, l → 0)}↓
hence {(h → 1)}R{(h → 0)}. Now take S2 = {(h → 1, l → 0)} ↓ and S3 = {(h →
0, l → 0)}↓. We have S2R+S3, and:
[[c3]]
†(S2) = {(h → 1, l → 0), (h → 0, l → 0)}↓
[[c2]]
†(S3) = {(h → 0, l → 1)}↓
Since the values of l do not match, we cannot have [[c3]]
†(S2)R+[[c2]]†(S3), hence
c3 R c2.
As predicted by Theorem 3.3, we also have c3 L c2. Indeed, for C = ; and
s0 = (h → 1, l → 0), we have [[C[c3]]](s0) ≤L [[C[c2]]](s0). 
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4 The low-level language
In this section, we deﬁne our low-level language. In this language, we use concrete
natural-number addresses for memory. We still use abstract location names, but
those are interpreted as natural numbers (according to a memory layout), and can
appear in arithmetic expressions.
4.1 Syntax and informal semantics
The syntax of the low-level language includes categories for natural-number expres-
sions, boolean expressions, and commands:
e ::= k | lnat |!e | e+ e | e ∗ e
b ::= e ≤ e | ¬b | tt | ff | b ∨ b | b ∧ b
c ::= e := e | if b then c else c | skip | c; c | c+ c | while b do c
where k ranges over numerals, and l over the ﬁnite set of store locations. Boolean
expressions are as in the high-level language. Natural-number expressions and com-
mands are also as in the high-level language, except for the inclusion of memory
locations among the natural-number expressions, and for the dereferencing con-
struct !e and assignment construct e := e′ where e is an arbitrary natural-number
expression (not necessarily a location).
Importantly, memory addresses are natural numbers, and a memory is a partial
function from those addresses to contents. We assume that accessing an address
at which the memory is undeﬁned constitutes an error that stops execution imme-
diately. In this respect, our language relies on the “fatal-error model” of Abadi
and Plotkin [3]. With more work, it may be viable to treat also the alternative
“recoverable-error model”, which permits attacks to continue after such accesses,
and therefore requires a bound on the number of such accesses.
4.2 Denotational semantics
4.2.1 Low-level memories, layouts, and errors
We assume given a natural number r > |Loc| that speciﬁes the size of the memory.
A memorym is a partial function from {1, . . . , r} to natural numbers; we write Mem
for the set of memories. A memory layout w is an injection from Loc to {1, . . . , r}.
We consider only memory layouts that extend a given public memory layout wp (an
injection from PubLoc to {1, . . . , r}), ﬁxed in the remaining of the paper. We let
W be the set of those layouts.
The security of layout randomization depends on the randomization itself. We
let d be a probability distribution on memory layouts (that extend wp). When ϕ
is a predicate on memory layouts, we write Pd(ϕ(w)) for the probability that ϕ(w)
holds with w sampled according to d.
Given a distribution d on layouts, we write δd for the minimum probability for
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a memory address to have no antecedent location (much as in [3]):
δd = min
i∈{1,...,r}\ran(wp)
Pd(i ∈ ran(w))
We assume that δd > 0. This probability bounds 1 minus the maximum probability
for an adversary to guess a location. For common distributions (e.g., the uniform
distribution), δd approaches 1 as r grows, indicating that adversaries fail most of
the time. We assume d ﬁxed below, and may omit it, writing δ for δd.
The denotational semantics of the low-level language uses the “error + nonter-
mination” monad Pξ⊥ =def (P + {ξ})⊥, which ﬁrst adds an “error” element ξ to P
and then a least element. As the monad is strong, functions f :P1× . . .×Pn → Qξ⊥
extend to functions f on (P1)ξ⊥× . . .×(Pn)ξ⊥, where f(x1, . . . , xn) is ξ or ⊥ if some
xj , but no previous xi, is; we write f for f .
For any memory layout w and store s, we let w ·s be the memory deﬁned on
ran(w) by:
w·s(i) = s(l) for w(l) = i
The notation w · s extends to s ∈ Sξ⊥, as above, so that w · ξ = ξ and w· ⊥=⊥. A
store projection is a function ζ :MemWξ⊥ of the form w → w · s, for some s ∈ Sξ⊥.
4.2.2 What should the denotational semantics be?
We discuss a simple example in order to explain our choice of type of the low-level
denotational semantics. A straightforward semantics might have the type:
W ×Mem → H(Memξ⊥)
so that the meaning of a command would be a function from layouts and memories
to sets of memories (modulo the use of the “error + nontermination” monad). Using
our example we argue that this is unsatisfactory, and arrive at a more satisfactory
alternative.
Suppose that there is a unique private location l, and that memory has four
addresses, {1, 2, 3, 4}. We write si for the store (l → i). The 4 possible layouts are
wi = (l → i), for i = 1, . . . , 4. Assume that d is uniform. Consider the following
command:
c4 = (1:=1) + (2:=1) + (3:=1) + (4:=1)
which nondeterministically guesses an address and attempts to write 1 into it. In-
tuitively, this command should fail to overwrite l most of the time. However, in a
straightforward semantics of the above type we would have:
[[c4]](wj , wj ·s0) = {ξ, wj ·s1} ↓
and we cannot state any quantitative property of the command, only that it some-
times fails and that it sometimes terminates.
One can rewrite the type of this semantics as:
Mem → H(Memξ⊥)W
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and view that as a type of functions that yield anH(Memξ⊥)-valued random variable
with sample space W (the set of memory layouts) and distribution d. Thus, in this
semantics, the nondeterministic choice is made after the probabilistic one —the
wrong way around, as indicated in the Introduction.
It is therefore natural to reverse matters and look for a semantics of type:
Mem → H(MemWξ⊥)
now yielding a set of Memξ⊥-valued random variables—so, making the nondeter-
ministic choice ﬁrst. Desirable as this may be, there seems to be no good notion of
composition of such functions.
Fortunately, this last problem can be overcome by changing the argument type
to also be that of Memξ⊥-valued random variables:
MemWξ⊥ → H(MemWξ⊥)
It turns out that with this semantics we have:
[[c4]](ζi) = {ζ1ξ , ζ2ξ , ζ3ξ , ζ4ξ } ↓
where ζi(w) = w ·si and ζiξ(w) = wi ·s1 if w = wi and = ξ otherwise. We can
then say that, for every nondeterministic choice, the probability of an error (or
nontermination, as we are using the lower powerdomain) is 0.75.
In a further variant in the deﬁnition of the semantics, one might replace Memξ⊥-
valued random variables by the corresponding probability distributions on Memξ⊥,
via the natural map Indd :Mem
W
ξ⊥ −→ V(Memξ⊥) induced by the distribution d on
W. Such a semantics could have the form:
Mem → HV(Memξ⊥)
mapping memories to probability distributions on memories, where HV is a pow-
erdomain for mixed nondeterministic and probabilistic choice as discussed above.
However, such an approach would imply (incorrectly) that a new layout is chosen
independently for each memory operation, rather than once and for all. In our
small example with the single private location l and four addresses, it would not
capture that (1 :=1); (2 :=1) will always fail. It would treat the two assignments in
(1 :=1); (2 :=1) as two separate guesses that may both succeed. Similarly, it would
treat the two assignments in (1 := 1); (1 := 2) as two separate guesses where the
second guess may fail to overwrite l even if the ﬁrst one succeeds. With a layout
chosen once and for all, on the other hand, the behavior of the second assignment
is completely determined after the ﬁrst assignment.
4.2.3 Denotational semantics
The denotational semantics
[[e]] : Mem×W →  ξ⊥ [[b]] : Mem×W → ξ⊥
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[[c+ c′]](ζ) = [[c]](ζ) ∪ [[c′]](ζ) [[c; c′]] = [[c′]]†◦[[c]] [[skip]] = η
[[e := e′]](ζ) = η(λw :W.Ass(ζ(w), [[e]]wζ(w), [[e
′]]wζ(w)))
[[if b then c else c′]] = Cond([[b]], [[c]], [[c′]])
[[while b do c]] = μθ :MemWξ⊥ → H(MemWξ⊥).Cond([[b]], θ†◦[[c]], η)
Fig. 3. Low-level denotational semantics
of expressions are deﬁned in a standard way, with, in particular, [[lnat]]
w
m = w(l),
and also [[!e]]wm = m([[e]]
w
m), if [[e]]
w
m ∈ dom(m), and = ξ, otherwise, using an obvious
notation for functional application. Note that these semantics never have value ⊥.
As discussed above, the denotational semantics of commands has type:
[[c]] :MemWξ⊥ → H(MemWξ⊥)
The deﬁnition is given in Figure 3; it makes use of two auxiliary deﬁnitions. We
ﬁrst deﬁne:
Ass :Memξ⊥ × ξ⊥ × ξ⊥ →  ξ⊥
by setting Ass(m,x, y) = m[x → y] if x ∈ dom(m) and = ξ, otherwise, for m ∈
Mem, x, y ∈  , and then using the function extension associated to the “error +
nontermination” monad. Second, we deﬁne
Cond(p, θ, θ′) :MemWξ⊥ → H(MemWξ⊥)
for any p :Mem×W → ξ⊥ and θ, θ′ :MemWξ⊥ → H(MemWξ⊥), by:
Cond(p, θ, θ′)(ζ) = {ζ ′ | ζ ′|Wζ,tt ∈ θ(ζ)|Wζ,tt , ζ ′|Wζ,ff ∈ θ′(ζ)|Wζ,ff ,
ζ ′(Wζ,ξ) ⊆ {ξ}, and ζ ′(Wζ,⊥) ⊆ {⊥}}
where Wζ,t =def {w | p(ζ(w), w) = t}, for t ∈ ξ⊥, and we apply restriction
elementwise to sets of functions.
Example 4.1 In this example, we demonstrate our low-level denotational seman-
tics. Consider the command:
c5 = l
′
nat := lnat; (!l
′
nat) := 1; l
′
nat := 0
This command stores the address of location l at location l′, then reads the contents
of location l′ (the address of l) and writes 1 at this address, and ﬁnally resets the
memory at location l′ to 0. Because of this manipulation of memory locations, this
command is not the direct translation of a high-level command.
Letting:
si,j = (l → i, l′ → j) ζi,j = w → w·si,j ζ ′i = w → w·(l → i, l′ → w(l))
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we have:
[[l′nat := lnat]](ζi,j) = {ζ ′i}↓
Note that ζi,j is a store projection, but ζ
′
i is not. We also have:
[[(!l′nat) := 1]](ζ
′
i) = {ζ ′1}↓ [[l′nat := 0]](ζ ′1) = {ζ1,0}↓
In sum, we have:
[[c5]](ζi,j) = {ζ1,0}↓

Looking at the type of the semantics
[[c]] :MemWξ⊥ → H(MemWξ⊥)
one may be concerned that there is no apparent relation between the layouts used
in the input to [[c]] and those in its output. However, we note that the semantics
could be made parametric. For every W ′ ⊆ W , replace W by W ′ in the deﬁnition
of [[c]] to obtain:
[[c]]W ′ :Mem
W ′
ξ⊥ → H(MemW
′
ξ⊥ )
There is then a naturality property, that the following diagram commutes for
all W ′′ ⊆ W ′ ⊆ W :
MemW
′
ξ⊥
[[c]]W ′ H(MemW ′ξ⊥ )
MemW
′′
ξ⊥
Memιξ⊥

[[c]]W ′′
 H(MemW ′′ξ⊥ )
H(Memιξ⊥)

where ι :W ′′ ⊆ W ′ is the inclusion map. Taking W ′ = W and W ′′ a singleton yields
the expected relation between input and output: the value of a random variable in
the output at a layout depends only on the value of the input random variable at
that layout. The naturality property suggests re-working the low level denotational
semantics in the category of presheaves over sets of layouts, and this may prove
illuminating (see [12] for relevant background).
4.3 Operational semantics
As a counterpart to the denotational semantics, we give a deterministic operational
semantics using oracles to make choices. The oracles are elements of the set Ω of
inﬁnite lists of tokens L (for “left”) and R (for “right”). A low-level state σ is:
• a triple 〈c,m, π〉 of a command c, a memory m, and an oracle π; or
• a pair 〈m,π〉 of a memory m and an oracle π; or
• the error element ξ.
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[[e]]wm ∈ dom(m) and [[e′]]wm = ξ
w |= 〈e := e′,m, π〉 → 〈m[[[e]]wm → [[e′]]wm], π〉
[[e]]wm ∈ dom(m) or [[e′]]wm = ξ
w |= 〈e := e′,m, π〉 → ξ
[[b]]wm = tt
w |= 〈if b then c else c′,m, π〉 → 〈c,m, π〉
[[b]]wm = ff
w |= 〈if b then c else c′,m, π〉 → 〈c′,m, π〉
[[b]]wm = ξ
w |= 〈if b then c else c′,m, π〉 → ξ
w |= 〈skip,m, π〉 → 〈m,π〉 w |= 〈c,m, π〉 → 〈c
′,m′, π′〉
w |= 〈c; c′′,m, π〉 → 〈c′; c′′,m′, π′〉
w |= 〈c,m, π〉 → 〈m′, π′〉
w |= 〈c; c′′,m, π〉 → 〈c′′,m′, π′〉
w |= 〈c,m, π〉 → ξ
w |= 〈c; c′′m,π〉 → ξ
w |= 〈c+ c′,m, Lπ〉 → 〈c,m, π〉 w |= 〈c+ c′,m,Rπ〉 → 〈c′,m, π〉
[[b]]wm = ff
w |= 〈while b do c,m, π〉 → 〈m,π〉
[[b]]wm = tt
w |= 〈while b do c,m, π〉 → 〈c; while b do c,m, π〉
[[b]]wm = ξ
w |= 〈while b do c,m, π〉 → ξ
Fig. 4. Low-level operational semantics
Transitions are given relative to a layout, so we write:
w |= σ → σ′
The rules are given in Figure 4. This semantics is deterministic for each choice of
layout. We write w |= σ ⇒ σ′ for the transitive closure of the transition relation
(for a given layout).
Example 4.2 Consider the command c4 introduced in Section 4.2.2, with added
parentheses for disambiguation:
c4 = (1:=1) + ((2:=1) + ((3:=1) + ((4:=1))))
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We have:
w1 |= 〈c4, w1 ·sk, Lπ〉 → 〈w1 ·s1, π〉 wj |= 〈c4, wj ·sk, Lπ〉 → ξ (j = 1)
w2 |= 〈c4, w2 ·sk, RLπ〉 ⇒ 〈w2 ·s1, π〉 wj |= 〈c4, wj ·sk, RLπ〉 ⇒ ξ (j = 2)
w3 |= 〈c4, w3 ·sk, RRLπ〉 ⇒ 〈w3 ·s1, π〉 wj |= 〈c4, wj ·sk, RRLπ〉 ⇒ ξ (j = 3)
w4 |= 〈c4, w4 ·sk, RRRπ〉 ⇒ 〈w4 ·s1, π〉 wj |= 〈c4, wj ·sk, RRRπ〉 ⇒ ξ (j = 4)

Using the operational semantics, we can deﬁne an evaluation function:
Eval : Com×W ×Mem× Ω → Memξ⊥
by:
Eval(c, w,m, π) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
m′ (w |= 〈c,m, π〉 ⇒ 〈m′, π′〉)
ξ (w |= 〈c,m, π〉 ⇒ ξ)
⊥ (otherwise)
We then deﬁne
Evalran : Com×MemWξ⊥ → Ω → MemWξ⊥
by:
Evalran(c, ζ)(π)(w) =
⎧⎨
⎩
Eval(w, c, ζ(w), π) (ζ(w) ∈ Mem)
ζ(w) (otherwise)
Making use of the image functional ImX :X
Ω → P(X), where ImX(f) = f(Ω), we
can state the consistency of the operational and denotational semantics:
Proposition 4.3 (Operational/denotational consistency) For c a command
and ζ a function in MemWξ⊥, we have:
[[c]](ζ) = ImMemWξ⊥
(Evalran(c, ζ)) ↓
The evaluation function yields operational correlates of the other possible de-
notational semantics discussed in Section 4.2.2, similarly, using image or induced
distribution functionals. For example, for the ﬁrst of those semantics, by currying
Eval and composing, one obtains:
Com×W ×Mem curry(Eval)−−−−−−−→ MemΩξ⊥
ImMemξ⊥−−−−−−→ P(Memξ⊥)
Using such operational correlates, one can verify operational versions of the asser-
tions made in Section 4.2.2 about the inadequacies of those semantics.
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4.4 Implementation relations and equivalences
Much as in the high-level language, we deﬁne a contextual implementation relation
and a simulation relation for the low-level language. The low-level deﬁnitions refer
to layouts, and in some cases include conditions on induced probabilities.
4.4.1 Contextual pre-order
Again, the contextual pre-order c L c′ may be interpreted as saying that c “reﬁnes”
(or “implements”) c′, in the sense that the publicly observable outcomes that c can
produce are a subset of those that c′ permits, in every public context. In comparison
with deﬁnition for the high-level language, however, c and c′ are not applied to an
arbitrary initial store but rather to a function from layouts to memories (extended
with “error + nontermination”), and they produce sets of such functions. We
restrict attention to argument functions induced by stores, in the sense that they
are store projections of the form w → w ·s. Thus, let f = [[C[c]]] and f ′ = [[C[c′]]]
for an arbitrary public context C, and let s be a store; then (roughly) for every ζ
in f(w → w·s) there exists ζ ′ in f ′(w → w·s) such that, for any w, ζ(w) and ζ ′(w)
coincide on public locations.
The treatment of error and nontermination introduces a further complication.
Speciﬁcally, we allow that ζ produces an error or diverges with suﬃcient probabil-
ity (≥ δ), and that ζ ′ produces an error with suﬃcient probability (≥ δ), as an
alternative to coinciding on public locations.
Therefore, we deﬁne L and some auxiliary notation and relations:
• Set PubMem =def Nran(wp). Then, for any memory m, let mL ∈ PubMem be the
restriction of m to ran(wp), extending the notation to Memξ⊥ as usual.
• For any ζ ∈ MemWξ⊥, we deﬁne ζL ∈ PubMemWξ⊥ by setting ζL(w) = ζ(w)L.
• For X,Y ∈ H(MemWξ⊥), we write that X ≤L Y when, for every ζ ∈ X, there
exists ζ ′ ∈ Y such that:
· ζL ≤ ζ ′L, or
· P (ζ(w) ∈ {ξ,⊥}) ≥ δ and P (ζ ′(w) = ξ) ≥ δ.
• For f, f ′ ∈ MemWξ⊥ → H(MemWξ⊥), we write f ≤L f ′ when, for all s ∈ S, we have:
f(w → w·s) ≤L f ′(w → w·s)
• Finally, we write c L c′ when, for every public command context C, [[C[c]]] ≤L
[[C[c′]]].
4.4.2 Simulation
As in the high-level language, we introduce a simulation relation . This rela-
tion works only on commands whose outcomes on inputs that are store projections
are themselves store projections; nevertheless, simulation remains a useful tool for
proofs.
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We deﬁne  : Sξ⊥ → H(MemWξ⊥) by:
(⊥) = {w →⊥}↓
(s) = {w → w·s}↓
(ξ) = {ζ|P (ζ(w) = ξ) ≥ δ}↓
For every X ∈ H(MemWξ⊥), we say that X is a store projection set when there exists
Y ∈ H(Sξ⊥) such that
(Y \ {ξ})↓⊆ X ⊆ (Y )↓
and
ξ ∈ Y ⇒ ∃ζ ∈ X.P (ζ(w) = ξ) ≥ δ
In that case, we write χ(X) = Y for the unique such Y ; we have s ∈ Y if, and
only if, w → w · s ∈ X and ξ ∈ Y if, and only if, ∃ζ ∈ X,P (ζ(w) = ξ) ≥ δ. (The
uniqueness of Y depends on the assumption that δ > 0.)
The ≤L relation restricted to store projection sets has a pleasant characteriza-
tion. The notation −L extends from S to Sξ⊥, so that ⊥L=⊥ and ξL = ξ; with
that, for any X in H(Sξ⊥), deﬁne XL in H(SLξ⊥) to be {sL | s ∈ X}.
Fact 4.4 Let X and Y be store projection sets. Then:
X ≤L Y ≡ χ(X)L ≤ χ(Y )L
Much as in the high-level language, we extend relations R over H(SHξ⊥) to
relations R× over H(MemWξ⊥). First we extend −s to H(Sξ⊥) as follows: for X ∈
H(Sξ⊥) and s ∈ SL, we let Xs ∈ H(SHξ⊥) be (X \ {ξ})s ∪ {ξ | ξ ∈ X}. Then,
given a relation R over H(SHξ⊥), we ﬁrst extend it to a relation R+ over H(Sξ⊥)
by setting
XR+Y ≡def (ξ ∈ X ⇒ ξ ∈ Y ) ∧
∀s ∈ SL. ((Xs \ ξ) = {⊥} ⇒ (Ys \ ξ) = {⊥}) ∧XsRYs
for X,Y ∈ H(Sξ⊥) and then deﬁne R× by setting:
XR×Y ≡def X and Y are store projection sets ∧ χ(X)R+χ(Y )
for X,Y ∈ H(MemWξ⊥). (Note that if R ⊆ H(SH⊥), then the high- and low-level
deﬁnitions of R+ coincide.)
If R is closed under increasing ω-sups (respectively, is right-closed under ≤,
is closed under binary unions) the same holds for R+, and then for R× (with ≤
restricted to store projection sets). If R is reﬂexive, then R+ is and R× is reﬂexive
on store projection sets. We also have, much as before, that, for X,Y ∈ H(Sξ⊥), if
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XR+Y then XL ≤ YL. It then follows from Fact 4.4 that, for X,Y ∈ H(MemWξ⊥),
if XR×Y then X ≤L Y .
For any f, f ′ :MemWξ⊥ → H(MemWξ⊥) and relation R over H(SH⊥) we write that
f R f ′ when:
∀X,Y ∈ H(MemWξ⊥). XR×Y ⇒ f †(X)R×f ′†(Y )
Finally, we write that f  f ′ if f R f ′ for some reﬂexive R closed under increasing
ω-sups, right-closed under ≤, and closed under binary unions.
4.4.3 Contextual pre-order vs. simulation
The contextual pre-order coincides with the simulation relation, but only for com-
mands whose semantics sends store projections to store projection sets. Formally,
we say that a given function f : MemWξ⊥ → H(MemWξ⊥) preserves store projections
if, for every s ∈ S, f(w → w ·s) is a store projection set. The coincidence remains
quite useful despite this restriction, which in particular is not an impediment to our
overall goal of relating the low-level language to the high-level language.
Theorem 4.5 Let c and c′ be two commands of the low-level language such that
[[c]] and [[c′]] preserve store projections. Then c L c′ holds if and only if [[c]]  [[c′]]
does.
Example 4.6 Suppose that there is only one private location, and consider the
two commands:
c4 = (1:=1) + (2:=1) + (3:=1) + (4:=1) c6 = (1:=1); (2 :=1)
As seen above, we have that [[c4]](ζi) = {ζ1ξ , ζ2ξ , ζ3ξ , ζ4ξ }↓. We also have that [[c6]](ζi) =
{w → ξ} ↓. Since P (ζiξ(w) = ξ) ≥ δ, we can verify that c4 and c6 are equivalent.
(Thus, a nondeterministic guess is no better than failure.) 
5 High and low
In this section we investigate the relation between the high-level language and the
low-level language. Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne a simple translation from the high-level
language to the low-level language, then we study its properties.
We deﬁne the compilation of high-level commands c (expressions e, boolean ex-
pressions b) to low-level commands c↓ (expressions e↓ and boolean expressions b↓) by
setting: (!lloc)
↓ =!lnat, (lloc := e)↓ = lnat := e↓, and proceeding homomorphically
in all other cases (e.g., (e + e′)↓ = e↓ + e′↓). Crucially, this compilation function,
which is otherwise trivial, transforms high-level memory access to low-level memory
access.
Lemma 5.1 Let c be a high-level command. Then [[c↓]] preserves store projections.
Theorem 5.2 relates the simulation relations of the two languages. It states that
a high-level command c simulates another high-level command c, with respect to
M. Abadi et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 298 (2013) 29–5048
all public contexts of the high-level language, if and only if the compilation of c
simulates the compilation of c′, with respect to all public contexts of the low-level
language.
Theorem 5.2 Let c and c′ be two high-level commands. Then [[c]]  [[c′]] holds if
and only if [[c↓]]  [[c′↓]] does.
Our main theorem, Theorem 5.3, follows from Theorem 5.2, the two previous
theorems, and the lemma. Theorem 5.3 is analogous to Theorem 5.2, but refers to
the contextual pre-orders: a high-level command c implements another high-level
command c′, with respect to all public contexts of the high-level language, if and
only if the compilation of c implements the compilation of c′, with respect to all
public contexts of the low-level language.
Theorem 5.3 (Main theorem) Let c and c′ be two high-level commands. Then
c L c′ holds if and only if c↓ L c′↓ does.
Theorem 5.3 follows from Theorem 5.2, the two previous theorems, and the
lemma. The low-level statement is deﬁned in terms of the probability δ that de-
pends on the distribution on memory layouts. When δ is close to 1, the statement
indicates that, from the point of view of a public context (that is, an attacker),
the compilation of c behaves like an implementation of the compilation of c′. This
implementation relation holds despite the fact that the public context may access
memory via natural-number addresses, and thereby (with some probability) read
or write private data of the commands. The public context may behave adaptively,
with memory access patterns chosen dynamically, for instance attempting to ex-
ploit correlations in the distribution of memory layouts. The public context may
also give “unexpected” values to memory addresses, as in practical attacks; the
theorem implies that such behavior is no worse at the low level than at the high
level.
For example, for the commands c0 and c1 of Example 3.1, the theorem enables
us to compare how their respective compilations behave, in an arbitrary public low-
level context. Assuming that δ is close to 1, the theorem basically implies that a
low-level attacker that may access memory via natural-number addresses cannot
distinguish those compilations. Fundamentally, this property holds simply because
the attacker can read or write the location h only with low probability.
6 Conclusion
A few recent papers investigate the formal properties of layout randomization, like
ours [19,3,13,2]. They do not consider nondeterministic choice, and tend to reason
operationally. However, the work of Jagadeesan et al. includes some semantic el-
ements that partly encouraged our research; speciﬁcally, that work employs trace
equivalence as a proof technique for contextual equivalence.
In this paper we develop a semantic approach to the study of layout random-
ization. Our work concerns nondeterministic languages, for which this approach
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has proved valuable in reconciling probabilistic choice with nondeterministic choice.
However, the approach is potentially more general. In particular, the study of con-
currency with nondeterministic scheduling would be an attractive next step. Also,
extending our work to higher-order computation presents an interesting challenge.
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